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TAX COMMENT
remedial tax measures unwise, the state legislature itself should
undo the harm without the assumed paternalistic intervention of the
Supreme Court.
WILLIAM H. SHAPIRO.*

THE GIFT TAX AS APPLIED TO REVOCABLE TRusTs.-Congress,

in 1924, included among the provisions of the revenue act of that
year, a tax upon gifts.I "For the calendar year 1924 and each
calendar year thereafter * * * a tax * * * is hereby imposed upon

the transfer by a resident by gift during such calendar year of
any property wherever situated, whether made directly or indirectly * * *." 2 This levy was included to supplement the estate
and income taxes, which had been frequently avoided by the making
of large gifts.3 The gift tax being a new venture in the field of
taxation, Congress did not expressly state its intention in- regard
to all the situations that might arise. It was not known until the
case of Burnet v. Guggenheim,4 whether Congress intended to include as a gift inter vivos the delivery of the revocable deed of trust
or whether the intent was to tax such gift upon the extinguishment
of the power of revocation.
In the Guggenheim case 5 it appeared that in June, 1917, the
defendant executed two. deeds of trust for the benefit of each of
his two children. The trusts were to continue for ten years. At
the end of the ten-year period, the principal and accumulated income were to go to the beneficiaries if living. In the event of their
death, other dispositions were made. The settlor also reserved to
himself powers of control in respect to the trust property and its
investment and administration. In particular, there was an unrestricted power to modify, alter or revoke the trusts except as to
* B.S.S., LL.B., J.S.D. (St. John's Law School, 1932), Tax Editor ST.
Member of the New York Bar.
REv. AcT OF 1924, 43 Stat. 253, 313, c. 234, §§319, 320, 26 U. S. C.,
§§1131, 1132; see (1930) 28 MIcH. L. Rtv. 778. This section was repealed by
the Revenue Act of 1926 and later incorporated into the Revenue Act of 1932.
GLEASON AND OTIS, INHERITANCE TAXATION (4th ed.) 182, "The federal gift
tax is a new departure in taxation-never before in the history of Englishspeaking people has such a tax been levied, and yet it is a natural outgrowth of
the effort of Congress and the state legislatures to reach the corpus of all
estates undiminished by any act of the decedent during his lifetime." Bromley
v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124, 50 Sup. Ct. 46 (1929); (1930) 4 ST. JOHN'S L.
Rv. 314.
2Ibid.
'Hunter, Gifts in Contemplation of Death, 7 NAT.- TAX Ass' BULLETIN
146; Note (1930) 5 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 147.
'287 U. S. -, 53 Sup. Ct. 369 (1933).
GIbid.
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incomes, received or accrued. The power of administration was
transferred by the settlor to others, and the power to modify, alter
or revoke was eliminated and thereby surrendered in July, 1925.
Prior to the cancellation of the power and subsequent to the execution of the deeds, the Revenue Act of 1914 was put into effect.
The majority, Mr. Justice Cardozo-writing the opinion, reversed the
decision of the lower court, 6 and held that the gift became taxable
when the power reserved by the settlor, to revest in himself title
to the corpus, had expired.
It was urged by the taxpayer in that case, 7 that title to the
property had passed prior to the enactment of the statute 8 in question and hence it must have been the intent of Congress to tax the
transfer at that time. Although it is true that a revocable trust
passes title immediately, 9 a discussion of the leading decisions' 0 will
lead to the conclusion that taxation is not so much concerned with
the inchoate title as it is with the shifting of the entire economic
benefits and control over the property taxed.
In the case of Bullen v. Wisconsin," the Court held that a
trust conveyed with the power of revocation reserved by the settlor
'Burnet v. Guggenheim, 58 F. (2d) 188, 192 (1932), "To impose this tax,
we must say to the petitioner that the property was still his while he had the
power to revoke, but when he gave up that power, he transferred the corpus by
way of gift. This we cannot do. Nor may we say that the income of the
property was still his while he held the power to revoke and when the income
went to the beneficiary it was a transfer of income by way of gift. When he
relinquished the power of revocation, he did not make the gift; that was made
when he created the trust of 1917."
'Supra
note 4.
8
Supra note 1.
'Jones v. Clifton, 101 U. S. 229 (1879), "The powers of revocation and
appointment to other uses reserved to the husband in the deeds in question do
not impair their validity or their efficiency in transferring the estate to the wife,
to be held by her until such revocation or appointment be made." Stone v.
Hacket, 12 Gray 227 (Mass. 1858)'; National Newark & Essex Banking Co. v.
Rosahl, 97 N. J. Eq. 74, 128 Atl. 586 (1925) ; Van Cott v. Prentice, 104 N. Y.
45, 54, 10 N. E. 257, 261 (1887), "The'existence of that [power of revocation
and control) inevitably leaves in the settlor an absolute control, since at any
moment he may end the trust and resume possession of the fund as his own.
The trustee is directed to hold the fund and invest and reinvest and pay over as
ordered, but is to do all this subject to the settlor's absolute control. This cannot mean that the trustee is to have no title and the trust no effective existence,
and the property remain the settlor's, but that the trust and the title, good and
effectual while it stands, is, nevertheless, to continue and exist only at the will
and pleasure of the settlor." Schreyer v. Schreyer, 101 App. Div. 456, 91 N. Y.
Supp. 1065 (1905), affd, 182 N. Y. 555, 75 N. E. 1134 (1905) ; see (1929) 42
H{ARV. L. REv. 958.
10 Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473 (1916) ; Saltonstall
v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 48 Sup. Ct. 225 (1928) ; Chase National Bank v.
United States, 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126 (1929); Reinecke v. Northern
Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123 (1929) ; Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S
376, 50 Sup. Ct. 336 (1930) ; Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct.
356 (1930) ; see Note (1931) 29 MIcH. L. REv. 796; (1928) 41 HARv. L. lZv.
916.
" Ibid.
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may be subject to an inheritance tax in the state of his domicile,
without violating the Constitution. Mr. Justice Holmes, who delivered the opinion of the Court, said :12
"The power to tax is not limited in the same way as
the power to affect the transfer of property. If this fund
had passed by intestate succession, it would be recognized
that by the traditions of our law the property is regarded as
a universitas the succession to the persona of the deceased."
Again in the case of Reinecke v. The Northern Trust Company,13 the Court held that a transfer in trust subject to a power
of revocation -in the transferror alone, terminable at his death, is not
complete until his death and hence a transfer tax applied to it, as
in Revenue Act of 1921, 3422, is not retroactive where his death
follows the date of the taxing statute, though the creation of the
trust preceded that date.
14
In the later case of Tyler v. United States, Mr. Justice
Sutherland pointedly said: 15
"The power of taxation is a fundamental and imperious
necessity of all government, not to be restricted by mere legal
fictions, whether that power has been properly exercised in
the present instance must be determined by the actual results
brought about by the death, rather than by a consideration of
the artificial rules which limit the title, rights and powers
of tenants by the entirety at common law."
The decision of the Court in the Guggenheim case1-6 may also
be upheld by the case of Saltonstall v. Saltonstall,'7 wherein the
Court passed upon the constitutionality of a state statute taxing
property which passed under a trust instrument created before the
date of its enactment, but where the power of appointment was
reserved. The defendant in the latter case 18 contended that the
statute deprived him of property without due process because he
was taxed on an interest he had already received before the enactment of the Act, also that he had vested interests or remainders
'Bullen v. Wisconsin, supra note 10, at 361, 36 Sup. Ct. at 474.
"'Supra note 10; (1930) 5 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 137
" Supra note 10.
Tyler v. United States, supra note 10, 281 U. S. at 503, 50 Sup. Ct. at 503.
" Supra note 4.
"'Supra note 10. This case upheld the so-called Massachusetts rule, on the
validity of a succession tax in such a case; that so long as the transfer is subject
to be defeated prior to the donor's death, no technical distinctions should be
taken between vested and contingent remainders but the transaction should be
deemed to take effect as of the time when there took place a final shifting of
benefits and burdens of property.
the economic
18

Ibid.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
subject only to being divested by the exercise of the reserved power
which never happened; that as the remainders vested before the
enactment of the taxing statutes it cannot constitutionally be applied
to them. The Court held that the act did not deprive the beneficiaries of property without due process of law, since, so long as
the privilege of succession had not been fully exercised, it could be
reached by tax. In the words of Mr. Justice Stone,19
"The present tax is not laid on the donor but on the
beneficiary; the gift taxed is not one long since contemplated,
but one which never passed to the beneficiaries beyond recall
until the death of the donor; and the value of the gift at that
operative moment, rather than at some later date, is the basis
of the tax.
"So long as the privilege of succession has not been
fully exercised it may be reached by tax."
Finally, in the case of Corliss v. Bowers, 20 Mr. Justice Holmes
said: 21

"But taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual command over the property
taxed-the actual benefit for which the tax is paid. If a
man directed his bank to pay over income as received to a
servant or friend, until further orders, no one would doubt
that he could be taxed upon the amounts paid. It is answered that in that case he would have a title whereas here
he did not. But from the point of view of taxation there
would be no difference. The title
would merely mean a right
place."
to stop payment before it took
It is submitted that the holding of the majority of the court in
the Guggenheim case 22 is correct, not only in purview of the present
gift tax, 23 wherein Congress expressly stated that its intent was to

have the tax apply at "the relinquishment or termination of such
" Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, supra note 10, 48 U. S. at 271, 276 Sup. Ct.
at 227.
' Supra note 10.
1 Corliss v. Bowers, supra note 10, 281 U. S. at 378, 50 Sup. Ct. at 336.
' Supra note 4.
' REVENUE AcT OF 1932, c. 209, 47 Stat. 169, 245, §501 (c) 26 U. S. C. A.,
§1136a (c) : "The tax shall not apply to a transfer of property in trust where
the power to revest in the donor title to such property is vested in the donor,
either alone or in conjunction with any person not having a substantial adverse
interest in the disposition of such property or the income therefrom, but the
relinquishment or termination of such power (other than the donor's death)
shall be considered to be a transfer by the donor by gift of the property subject
to such power, and any payment of the income therefrom to a beneficiary other
than the donor shall be considered to be a transfer by the donor of such income
by gift."
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24
power," or upon the application of the doctrine of stare decesis,

but also from the standpoint of its practicability. It could not have
been the intent of Congress to lay the tax at once, while the deed
was still subject to the power of revocation, for such a gift might
never have become consummate. If the grantor of a revocable
trust deed would exercise his power of revocation, he would be burdened by a tax upon the transfer of the entire principal, when actually only a gift of the income had been made. Since it is the rule
that in the construction of a taxing act doubt is to be resolved in
favor of the greatest number of taxpayers effected by it,25 the
contention of the taxpayer, in the case under discussion, 26 cannot
be upheld.
ALFRED HECKER.

LEGISLATION TO PREVENT CORPORATE EVASION OF TAxE.-As

long as the Government's main source of revenue is derived from
taxation just so long will the attempts of man to defeat it continue.
Nor is the legislature unmindful of this as is evidenced by the preponderance of conditions, exceptions, limitations and modifications
that constitute nearly every such statute.
Perhaps the outstanding embodiment of this is noticed in the
Revenue Act of 1932, Section 104, dealing with surtax on personal
income. The main objective of this act is to prevent the utilization
of the corporate entity theory to lessen materially or defeat the
amount due as a tax on personal income. That there is a considerable advantage to be gained by permitting one's income to accumulate in the coffers of a corporation can readily be perceived
when we recall that the Government demands a levy of only thirteen per cent on the income of a corporation no matter how large
it may be, but requests the private individual to pay over as much
as fifty-five per cent. Further, the corporation is not taxable at
all if the source of its income is derived from dividends of other
corporations. 1 Is it surprising, then, that this situation will result
' Supra note 10.
'American Net and Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S. 468 (1891);
Benzger v. United States, 192 U. S.38 (1904) ; Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S.151,
153, 38 Sup. Ct. 53, 54 (1917), "in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes
it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond
the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operations so as to
embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the Government, and in favor of the citizen";

United States v. Merriam, 263 U. S.179, 44 Sup. Ct. 69 (1923) ; Tyler v.
United States, supra note 10, 281 U. S. at 503, 50 Sup. Ct. at 503, "Taxation,
as it many times has been said, is eminently practical * * *." See also Note
(1931) 6 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 172 and cases cited therein.

' Supra note 4.
'REVENUE

AcT of 1932, §23.

